Montenegrin spy in Russian unit Center 795

At the end of February, Denis Alimov was arrested in Bogotá, Colombia, on an Interpol warrant. According to The Insider, he is a prominent member of the new Russian unit Center 795, which was intended to replace the compromised Russian military intelligence GRU unit 29155.

Alimov was arrested on charges of organizing an attempted assassination of two prominent Chechen dissidents based in Europe, offering a reward of 1.5 million euros per target. The FBI tracked him for more than a year and ultimately uncovered him through Google Translate, which he used to communicate with Montenegrin citizen Darko Đurović - whom Alimov had recruited as the main field operative for the operation.

Advance payment and promise

The financial terms were explicit. During the October 2024 meeting in Moscow, Denis Alimov gave Darko Đurović, a Montenegrin citizen residing in the United States, a 60,000 euros advance and promised 1.5 million euros for locating and delivering each of the two Chechen dissidents based in Europe, according to The Insider’s investigative team. If the operation succeeded and additional targets were identified, he was told that a third person - wanted „dead or alive“ - could bring a reward exceeding 10 million euros.

A major investigative report by the international team of The Insider revealed the operations of the new Russian unit Center 795. This new intelligence-military formation was designed to replace the compromised GRU unit 29155. Members of Center 795 used encrypted messaging apps, pseudonyms, and segmented communication. However, they failed to anticipate that language barriers between their own operatives could become a weak point: Alimov spoke Russian, Đurović Serbian, so they used Google Translate to communicate.

- Surveillance logs, parts of which are cited in the newly unsealed U.S. grand jury indictment, at times read like an absurdist document: two operatives of the most secretive Russian assassination unit conspiring to carry out a contract killing via a consumer translation tool, while every instruction and status report is stored in readable, time-stamped records on the servers of an American company. As one source close to the investigation later noted, it was even better than wiretapping, because it arrived already transcribed - writes The Insider.

Messages were transmitted via encrypted applications believed to be secure. However, Google operates through servers in the United States, placing it directly within the reach of FBI surveillance warrants. The Insider reports that FBI investigators, based on a court order, were able to directly access these translations, reading streams of operational communication in real time.

„I have peo

ple who would pay a lot…“

Documents obtained by the FBI show that in late November 2024, Đurović informed Alimov that he was in Montenegro and would attempt to locate the target in New York at the end of December. He also shared details about the target, noting that the individual was mostly in the United States, although trying to create the impression of being constantly in EU countries.

Investigators also found that Đurović used search engines to look for what was likely a murder weapon – „Glock 17“, „Glock 21“, „Glock 22“ - as well as where to obtain model 22 in Podgorica.

Đurović also sought help from an unnamed accomplice in the United States. On Christmas Eve 2024, he sent a message: „I have people who would pay a lot of money for this person and others like them to be arrested and handed over to them. For now, I have three or more individuals wanted for arrest... We get 1.5 million dollars per person. We need a collaborator who won’t ask many questions but will provide us with that information, and after I confirm the location (I will verify it myself), we receive the money“.

The potential sub-agent requested a return advance from Alimov to finance a „hunting team“.

The use of Google Translate, writes The Insider, was not Đurović’s only operational mistake. He traveled to Russia twice, in July and October 2024, attempting to conceal his destination by booking apparent vacations in Turkey and then continuing to Moscow with connecting flights under his real name.

- Each time he returned to the United States, he was questioned by FBI agents who had access to his flight records. He explicitly denied having been in Russia. These lies were transparent and further worsened his legal position. The FBI, however, was prepared to wait, continuing to monitor him and read his virtual diary on Google Translate, before finally arresting him in March 2025 - writes The Insider.

SFO

Interestingly, in previous years, Darko Đurović was very active on social media. He presented himself as a security expert and took a strongly negative stance toward Ukraine’s efforts to defend its territory following Russia’s attacks. He mainly used the nickname „SFO“ on the social network X. Even after his arrest, his profile remained active for some time.

Denis Alimov was arrested a year after Darko Đurović was detained. Clues about how their cooperation began may lie, The Insider writes, in Alimov’s phone contacts, which included Dejan Berić and Davor Savičić - Serbian recruiters of mercenaries for the Russian military in Ukraine, long targeted by Western intelligence services. It is possible that Alimov met Đurović through them, who holds dual Serbian and Montenegrin citizenship.

The exposure of Center 795 is expected to create long-term problems for Russian intelligence services. The unit was formed after the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and brings together elite units from the GRU and FSB. It was established as a strictly secret and fully autonomous structure designed to carry out the most critical operations, ranging from military missions in Ukraine to political assassinations and kidnappings abroad. To provide cover for the unit, it was embedded within the Kalashnikov Concern, the well-known Russian weapons manufacturer, a private company in which the state defense conglomerate Rostec retains a blocking minority stake.