Vukčević: Communication does not constitute evidence of criminal association
What is particularly unacceptable is the position taken by the Court of Appeals, set out on pages four and five of its ruling, that the fact that the indictment does not specify when the alleged organiser, Aleksandar Mijajlović, recruited the other members of the criminal organisation, when and how he assigned them their roles and tasks, or when they accepted those roles and tasks, is irrelevant to the assessment of whether reasonable suspicion exists. In the defence’s view, such a position relativises precisely those facts that are essential to establishing the existence of a criminal organisation - lawyer Vukčević stressed

No evidence has been presented against Drago Spičanović, the former head of the Counterintelligence Service of the National Security Agency, that would justify reasonable suspicion that he was a member of a criminal organisation or that he committed any of the other criminal offences with which he is charged. The confirmation of an indictment is not proof of guilt, and communication between individuals is not the same as criminal association. In the continuation of the proceedings, we will insist on a full and adversarial examination of all evidence, and we are convinced that it will become clear that the charges against Spičanović, as well as the other defendants, lack the necessary factual and legal foundation - Spičanović’s defence lawyer, Dr Miloš Vukčević, told ETV Portal, commenting on the Court of Appeals’ decision to overturn the High Court’s ruling and confirm the indictment.
In addition to Spičanović, the indictment names businessman Aleksandar Mijajlović, Senior State Prosecutor Andrijana Nastić, police officials Milovan Pavićević and Vladan Lazović, and politician Predrag Bošković.
ARBITRARY ASSUMPTIONS
Vukčević points out that the judicial review of an indictment is not a mere formality, nor should a court become an institution that simply endorses the prosecution’s conclusions. The essence of reviewing an indictment, he says, is to prevent citizens from being brought before a court on the basis of arbitrary assumptions, insufficiently specific charges and evidentiary constructions that fail to meet the statutory threshold of reasonable suspicion.
- If it were sufficient for the prosecution to present communications between certain individuals and, on that basis, conclude that a criminal organisation existed without sufficiently concrete indicators of organised criminal activity, there would be a serious risk of an impermissible expansion of the boundaries of criminal liability. The right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence must not depend on how much public attention a particular indictment receives, but exclusively on the law and the evidence - Vukčević stated firmly.
In the defence’s assessment, the Court of Appeals’ decision reflects a seriously problematic interpretation of the legal standard of reasonable suspicion and the requirements for establishing the criminal offence of creating a criminal organisation.
Vukčević notes that what is particularly concerning is the way in which the Court of Appeals draws conclusions from the content of individual communications between the defendants to establish reasonable suspicion that Spičanović and the others acted as members of a criminal organisation, without providing sufficiently specific and individualised reasons to substantiate the existence of the statutory elements of such an organisation.
- The mere fact that certain individuals communicated with one another, exchanged information, discussed political and social events or knew one another does not, without additional evidentiary support arising from the content and circumstances of those communications, constitute reasonable suspicion that they conspired to commit criminal offences - Vukčević stressed.
UNACCEPTABLE POSITION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
According to him, in order for communications to support a conclusion that reasonable suspicion of creating a criminal organisation exists, their content must, either independently or in conjunction with other evidence, point to specific facts concerning the existence of a criminal association, its objective, its modus operandi and the conscious decision of each individual defendant to join such an association.
In the defence’s view, the prosecution failed to present such evidence, while the Court of Appeals did not convincingly explain the grounds on which it considers these statutory requirements to have been met.
- What is particularly unacceptable is the position taken by the Court of Appeals, set out on pages four and five of its ruling, that the fact that the indictment does not specify when the alleged organiser, Aleksandar Mijajlović, recruited the other members of the criminal organisation, when and how he assigned them their roles and tasks, or when they accepted those roles and tasks, is irrelevant to the assessment of whether reasonable suspicion exists. In the defence’s view, such a position relativises precisely those facts that are essential to establishing the existence of a criminal organisation - lawyer Vukčević emphasised.
He recalls that Article 401a, paragraph 6, of the Criminal Code of Montenegro, in the version in force at the time of the alleged offences, stipulated that a criminal organisation consists of three or more persons whose aim is to commit serious criminal offences in order to obtain unlawful financial gain or power, provided that at least three of eight additional statutory conditions are met.
Among these conditions, Vukčević explains, the law expressly stipulated that each member must have an assigned or clearly identifiable task or role, that the organisation’s activities must be planned over an extended period, that internal rules of control and discipline must exist, as well as other alternative circumstances prescribed by law indicating organised criminal activity.
- The fundamental legal question is this: how can a court conclude that there is reasonable suspicion of the creation of a criminal organisation without first identifying the specific facts and evidence indicating that the legally required conditions have been met? If it is not known on what basis an individual became a member of a criminal organisation, how they accepted its criminal objective, or through which actions they demonstrated their affiliation with such an organisation, reasonable suspicion cannot be based solely on the fact that they were in contact with the alleged organiser - lawyer Vukčević points out.
He recalls that the law does not require every association to be formalised through a written agreement, nor does it require the exact moment of joining to always be established through direct evidence. However, he says, it does require the existence of specific circumstances from which reasonable suspicion of a conscious decision to join and act within a criminal organisation can be inferred. Such circumstances cannot simply be presumed.
MISAPPLICATION OF THE LEGAL STANDARD
Vukčević emphasised that, in the defence’s view, the Court of Appeals also misunderstands and misapplies the standard of reasonable suspicion when it leaves certain decisive questions to be resolved at trial, arguing that the purpose of the indictment review stage is not to establish the defendants’ guilt.
- It is true that guilt is not determined at this stage of the proceedings, nor should the court demand evidence sufficient to support a conviction. However, this by no means implies that an indictment can be confirmed without sufficiently specific evidence establishing reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion is not an unfettered assumption on the part of the prosecution; it is a statutory evidentiary standard that must be based on concrete facts and evidence - Vukčević warns.
He explains that the difference between reasonable suspicion and proven guilt lies in the degree of evidentiary certainty, not in the fact that assumptions may be accepted in place of evidence when establishing reasonable suspicion.
According to Vukčević, the prosecution is not required to prove the defendant’s guilt at this stage, but it is required to present sufficient evidence to justify reasonable suspicion that a particular individual committed a specific criminal offence.
He believes that an indictment cannot first be confirmed and that the prosecution cannot then search for evidence at trial that is supposed to justify its confirmation.
- Otherwise, the judicial review of an indictment would lose its statutory purpose, and any citizen could be brought before a criminal court on the basis of arbitrary prosecutorial conclusions, with the explanation that the existence of evidence justifying the charges would only be examined during the trial. Such an interpretation would seriously undermine the institution of judicial review of indictments, whose primary function is precisely to prevent criminal proceedings from being conducted in cases where the evidentiary basis required by law does not exist - Vukčević explained.
ALLEGED BENEFIT
According to him, another particular problem is the complete lack of sufficient specificity regarding the alleged objective of obtaining unlawful financial gain or power, which is one of the essential elements of the statutory definition of a criminal organisation.
As the defence has already pointed out, the indictment does not identify any specific benefit obtained by the defendants, nor does it present sufficiently concrete evidence from which it could be concluded that there was a common criminal objective aimed at obtaining unlawful financial gain or power.
Lawyer Vukčević considers it legally unacceptable to equate the acquisition or exchange of certain information with the acquisition of unlawful power.
- The mere receipt of certain information, without evidence of its specific use, exploitation or conversion into unlawful benefit or power, cannot automatically be regarded as proof that the criminal objective of obtaining unlawful financial gain or power was achieved, or even that such an objective existed. If an individual receives information, that alone does not mean that they have obtained a particular benefit, gained control over state institutions or acquired powers vested in state authorities. Information and power are not the same thing. Possessing information does not automatically mean exercising public authority, nor can access to certain information be equated with the acquisition of unlawful power without further evidentiary reasoning - lawyer Vukčević explained.
According to him, the prosecution would have to specify what the alleged unlawful benefit or power sought by the defendants consisted of, how they intended to obtain it, and which facts and evidence indicate that this was indeed their common criminal objective.
He adds that any unlawful acquisition or disclosure of particular information constitutes a separate criminal-law issue. Even if it were established, he says, that information had been unlawfully disclosed, this would not automatically lead to the conclusion that a criminal organisation existed.
- One cannot conclude that someone acquired unlawful power merely because they received certain information, without concrete evidence of a broader criminal plan and objective, and then use that conclusion as the basis for reasonable suspicion that a criminal organisation existed. That would amount to using one assumption to prove another. With regard to my client, Drago Spičanović, the Court of Appeals relies, in a significant part of its reasoning, on communications involving other defendants, including those in which his name is merely mentioned. The fact that someone's name appears in communications between third parties does not mean that the person knew of the existence of a criminal organisation, accepted its criminal plan or carried out tasks within such an organisation - Vukčević said.
According to lawyer Vukčević, such conclusions require specific and individualised evidence, rather than the linking of isolated communications into a prosecutorial narrative established in advance.
He recalls that the High Court refused to confirm the indictment precisely because it concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish reasonable suspicion that the defendants had committed the criminal offences with which they were charged.
- However, the Court of Appeals, based on a different assessment of the same body of evidence, reached the completely opposite decision. We do not dispute that the Criminal Procedure Code provides for the possibility of amending a first-instance ruling. However, the exercise of such authority entails an obligation on the second-instance court to provide clear, relevant and sufficient reasons for considering that the first-instance court was wrong to conclude that there was insufficient evidence to establish reasonable suspicion. In our view, the contested decision does not provide such reasons in a satisfactory manner - lawyer Vukčević concluded.